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INTRODUCTION
In traditional general equilibrium theory, the following propositions rank among the most celebrated ones:
First Welfare Theorem (FWT): A competitive equilibrium allocation is Pareto optimal.
Second Welfare Theorem (SWT): A Pareto optimal allocation is a competitive equilibrium allocation with wealth redistribution.
Core Containment Theorem (CCT): A competitive equilibrium allocation is a core allocation.
Core Equivalence Theorem (CET): If the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space, then a core allocation is a competitive equilibrium allocation.
The FWT and the SWT indicate the efficiency of a market system, while the CCT and the CET indicate the institutional stability of a market system. Efficiency is a necessary condition for institutional stability, that is, a core allocation is Pareto optimal. Thus the CCT implies the FWT in particular.
It has been recognized since Malinvaud (1953) that a market system is efficient in allocating resources over a finite, but not over an infinite time horizon. In the context of an overlapping generations economy, Samuelson (1958) observed that the FWT does not hold. Balasko and Shell (1980) provided conditions under which a competitive allocation is Pareto optimal. They also generalized the FWT and the SWT to an overlapping generations economy, replacing Pareto optimality by short run Pareto optimality.
Regarding the institutional stability of a market system in an infinite horizon economy, there has been some progress both in obtaining conditions under which ' We are grateful to Karl Shell for his encouragement and helpful discussions, and to an anonymous referee for helpful comments. The second author fully acknowledges financial support from Fundaci6n Banco Exterior. 519 a market allocation is fully stable and in characterizing the limited stability of a market system. From Samuelson's (1958) observation that the FWT does not hold, it is clear that the CCT does not hold either in an overlapping generations economy. Hendricks, Judd and Kovenock (1980) and Kovenock (1984) showed that the core of an overlapping generations economy may even be empty. Esteban (1986) and Kovenock (1984) provided sufficient conditions for a Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allocation to be in the core of a simple overlapping generations economy. Chae (1987) and Esteban and Millan (1984) provided sufficient conditions for a competitive allocation to be in the core of an overlapping generations economy. Chae (1987) generalized the CCT and the CET to an overlapping generations economy, replacing the core by a short run core.
Chae's short run core is the set of allocations which belong to the cores of a sequence of truncated finite period economies. It is a subset of the bounded core, the set of allocations which are not improved upon by any bounded coalition, as shown by Chae (1987) . Thus another generalization of the CCT is obtained by replacing the core by the bounded core. A natural question that arises is whether the short run core is a proper subset of the bounded core. Another interesting question, which can be regarded as a refinement of the previous question, is whether the short run core is a proper subset of the bounded core even if the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space, for in this case the short run core is equal to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations. Since a short run core allocation is short run Pareto optimal, an answer to the first question is easily obtained by observing that a bounded core allocation is not necessarily short run Pareto optimal. Since the same argument holds even if the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space, it also provides an answer to the second question.
In this essay, we will characterize the set of Pareto optimal allocations, the core, the bounded core, the set of short run Pareto optimal allocations, the short run core, and the set of competitive equilibrum allocations for a simple overlapping generations economy. Using this characterization, we show that there exists a bounded core allocation which is not short run Pareto optimal. Using the continuum version of the same economy, we also show that there exists a bounded core allocation which is not a competitive equilibrium allocation even if the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space. We submit that the bounded core does not serve as a criterion for the efficiency of allocations in an overlapping generations economy, for it may include allocations which are not even short run Pareto optimal. We also submit that the bounded core is a weak criterion for the robustness of allocations in an overlapping generations economy, for it may not shrink to the set of competitive equilibrium allocations as the individual agents become negligible.
THE MODEL AND RESULTS
Consider a pure exchange, overlapping generations economy. There is one perishable commodity in each period t = 1, 2, .... One generation consists of one agent. Generation t (p&2) has preferences over consumptions during periods t and t + 1, represented by the utility function i.e., ut(Ct) -ut(ct) for any t E S and ut(Ct) > ut(ct) for some t E S. DEFINITION 
An allocation c is said to be i) Pareto optimal, if it is not improved upon by G, ii) a core allocation, if it is not improved upon by any coalition, iii) a bounded core allocation, if it is not improved upon by any bounded coalition, iv) short run Pareto optimal, if there exists no allocation c, which differs from c only in finite periods, such that ut(C,) -ut(c,) for any t and ui (Ct,) > u t(c ,) for some t, v) a short run core allocation, if for any s -2, there exists some t > s such that (cl.. c,) belongs to the core of the t-economy, which is the t period economy where only generations lip to t participate and where generation t has endowment e,' and utility function u t(c t) = c,'
vi) a competitive equilibrium allocation, if there exists a price system p = (p , p2, . . .) such that for any t, pct < pet and ut(Ct) < ut(ct) for any c, which satisfies pct ? pet.
For the definition of the short run core in a general overlapping generations economy, see Chae (1987) . The above definition is equivalent to the general definition for our economy, where the utility functions are intertemporally separable and where there is only one agent in each generation.
Let us denote by PO, C, BC, SPO, SC, and E the set of Pareto optimal allocations, the core, the bounded core, the set of short run Pareto optimal allocations, the short run core, and the set of competitive equilibrium allocations, respectively. Chae (1987) shows that the following relations hold for a general overlapping generations economy: C C BC, C C PO C SPO, E C SC C BC n SPO, and E = SC if the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space. For our economy, these sets are completely characterized as follows: The intuition for this result is easily provided. An allocation is the result of an infinite sequence of transactions. When only finite coalitions are allowed to improve upon an allocation, some Pareto improving reallocation among a finite coalition may not take place, for the reallocation deprives the last agent in the coalition of its transfer from the infinite future.
Since SC C BC n SPO, the above result also implies that SC is a proper subset of BC. Furthermore, one can show that SC is a proper subset of BC n SPO. Let c be an allocation such that cl = (1, 0), c2 = (0, 1, 1), and c, = (0, 1) if t -3 . Then c E BC n SPO but c f SC. The intuition for this example is also easily provided. An allocation, which is not improved upon by any finite coalition and for which there is no Pareto improving reallocation among any finite coalition, may be improved upon by an agent if the agent's planning horizon is truncated.
We will now show that the above discussions remain valid even if the individual agents become negligible. Consider a variant of the above economy which is the same as the above one except for the demographic structure of a generation. In the old economy, there was one agent in each generation. In the new economy, generation t consists of a continuum of identical agents represented as points in the half chosen interval Gt = [t, t + 1), equipped with the Lebesgue measure. The definitions of PO, C, BC, SPO, SC, and E for this economy are straightforward and will not be formally introduced here. We refer inquisitive readers who demand the formal definitions to Chae (1987) The proof is similar to that for the discrete economy, and will not be presented here. Since E = SC C BC n SPO, the continuum analogue of the example used to prove Proposition 1 can also be used to prove PROPOSITION 2. There exists a bounded core allocation which is not a competitive equilibrium allocation even if the set of agents is a nonatomic measure space.
Of course, one can also prove the above proposition using the continuum 
